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Product-harm crises can seriously imperil a brand’s performance. Consumers tend to weigh 
negative publicity heavily in product judgments, customer preferences may shift towards 
competing products during the recall period, and competitors often increase their advertising 
spending in the wake of a brand’s misfortune.  To counter these negative effects, brands hope 
to capitalize on their equity, and often use advertising as a communication device to regain 
customers’ lost trust. 
   We develop a multiple-event hazard model to study how consumer characteristics and 
advertising influence consumers’ first-purchase decisions for two affected brands of peanut 
butter following a severe Australian product-harm crisis. Buying a recently affected brand is 
perceived as highly risky, making the trial purchase a first hurdle to be taken in the brand’s 
recovery. Both pre-crisis loyalty and familiarity are found to form an important buffer against 
the product-harm crisis, supporting the idea that a brand’s equity prior to the crisis offers 
resilience in the face of misfortune. Also heavy users tend to purchase the affected brands 
sooner, unless their usage rate decreased significantly during the crisis.  Brand advertising 
was found to be effective for the stronger brand, but not for the weaker brand, while 
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Product-harm incidents are prevalent in the marketplace.  Notable examples include traces of 
benzene in Perrier (Kurzbard and Siomkos 1992) and Bridgestone/Firestone’s malfunctioning 
tires (Advertising Age 2000).  Such crises can be devastating to a company and harmful for 
society. According to the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, injuries, deaths, and 
property damages related to consumer products cost the American public over $700 billion 
annually. An average of about 25,100 deaths and 33.3 million injuries was associated with 
defective consumer products in recent years (U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission 
2005).  Obviously, the financial losses incurred by the firm involved tend to be huge as well.  
Apart from the enormous costs directly linked to a product recall, the often prolonged out-of-
stock situation that goes with it may cause substantial future revenue losses (Goldfarb 2006), 
especially in combination with the negative information surrounding the event (Ahluwalia, 
Burnkrant, and Unnava 2000). Estimates for the direct costs of Perrier’s 1990 crisis are 
around $30 million (Berman 1999), while one year later sales had only reached 60 percent of 
their pre-recall level (Hartley 1995). Likewise, the Snow Brand Milk food-poisoning scandal 
in Japan had a devastating impact on the company’s bottom line: it incurred a loss of 51.6 
billion yen in fiscal 2001, compared to a net profit of 3.3 billion yen in fiscal 1999 
(Finkelstein 2005).  
Because of the increasing complexity of products, more stringent product-safety 
legislation, and more demanding customers, product-harm crises tend to occur ever more 
frequently (Dawar and Pillutla 2000). The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, for 
example, completed 397 cooperative recalls in 2005, involving 67 million consumer products 
(U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission 2005), compared to only 221 recalls affecting 8 




   
 
A recent PWC study found that the weekly number of product recalls notified to the European 
Commission has risen from an average of 6 in 2004 to 14 in 2005.
1  Moreover, a product 
crisis can have a significant effect on consumers’ purchase behavior. One industry study 
ranked a company’s handling of a crisis as third most important criterion for consumers to 
decide which product to purchase (Marketing News 1995).
2  In spite of their increasing 
occurrence, the huge risks for the affected companies and society, and their often profound 
impact on consumer behavior, research on product crises remains scant (Klein and Dawar 
2004). 
 Previous research has often focused on providing a check-list on how to deal with a 
product crisis, usually based on particular case studies (e.g., Kurzbard and Siomkos 1992; 
Smith, Thomas, and Quelch 1996). Another research stream has concentrated on estimating 
the effect of a product crisis on aggregate performance measures, such as stock prices (e.g., 
Davidson and Worrell 1992; Salin and Hooker 2001) and category or brand sales (e.g., Smith, 
van Ravenswaay, and Thompson 1988; van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 2006). While this 
research provides valuable insights, it does not examine individual differences in how 
consumers react to a product-harm crisis. 
Individual-level differences have been looked at in several lab experiments examining 
the impact of hypothetical brand crises on brand evaluations and purchase intentions. In these 
studies, negative news is consistently found to have a devastating impact on companies, as it 
is perceived to be more diagnostic and informative, and weighed more heavily in consumer 
judgments (Herr, Kardes, and Kim, 1991). However, this negativity bias is found to be 
moderated by some consumer characteristics, such as commitment to the brand (Ahluwalia, 
Burnkrant, and Unnava 2000), brand familiarity (Ahluwalia 2002), and consumers’ 




   
 
have established the moderating effect of certain consumer characteristics, a number of 
external-validity issues can be raised. First, the experimental setting might attract artificial 
attention to the product crisis (Mowen, Jolly, and Nickell 1981).  Furthermore, reported 
intentions and behavior are known to not always coincide (Chandon, Morwitz, and Reinartz 
2005).  In addition, these studies offer limited insight into the moderating effect of marketing 
decision variables such as advertising, an instrument companies often use to restore their 
brands’ tarnished image. Finally, marketplace dynamics, such as spontaneous information 
sharing among consumers and competitive activity, are typically not accounted for (Dawar 
and Pillutla 2000). In this study, we use scanner data from a QDWXUDO experiment, and shed 
light on the impact of own and competitive advertising, while accounting for individual-level 
differences in how consumers react to the crisis.  We hereby respond to Winer’s (1999) call 
for more scanner studies supporting results found in lab studies to enhance external validity.  
Specifically, we use real-life household-scanner data that record consumer purchases, 
before, during and after a severe product-harm crisis. In June 1996, Kraft Foods, Australia’s 
largest peanut-butter manufacturer, recalled its two peanut-butter products, Eta and Kraft, 
because they were linked to more than 100 cases of salmonella poisoning (Sydney Morning 
Herald 1996a). The bacterial infection was traced to a batch of contaminated peanuts, 
supplied to the group by an outside manufacturer. Kraft Foods Australia was engulfed in the 
worst crisis in its 70-year history. In the meantime, its main competitor Sanitarium took 
advantage of the crisis situation by stressing in several advertising campaigns that it had been 
roasting its own peanuts. Sanitarium’s market share increased from 15 to 70 percent during 
the crisis period (Sydney Morning Herald 1996a). Despite this spectacular performance boost 
for Sanitarium, overall demand for peanut-butter products was down by 30 percent (Sydney 
Morning Herald 1996b).




   
 
Within this setting, we focus on the first-purchase decision after the product-harm 
crisis, as it is typically associated with higher risk in the diffusion literature (Rogers 1995). 
Especially in case of a product-harm crisis, buying a recently affected brand is perceived as 
highly risky (Pennings, Wansink, and Meulenberg 2002), making the trial purchase a first 
hurdle to be taken in order to regain a consumer’s trust. Indeed, repeat purchases are 
contingent on a trial purchase to have taken place, while trial is not contingent on repeat 
(Steenkamp and Gielens 2003). We study the effect of consumer characteristics, such as pre-
crisis brand loyalty, brand familiarity, and category usage on the timing of the trial purchase 
of the affected brands after the crisis. In addition, we focus on the effectiveness of Kraft 
Foods’ post-crisis advertising campaign, as well as the impact of advertising expenditures by 
non-affected competitors.  Devising a proper communication strategy is a key challenge for 
companies faced with a crisis situation (e.g., Hale, Dulek, and Hale 2005; Coombs 2000).  As 
we consider the trial of two affected brands, we specify a multi-event hazard model, and use 
the clustered error-correction approach advocated by Lin (1994) to correct for unobserved 
dependence between a given household’s purchase decisions of the two brands. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first present our conceptual 
framework.  Next, we discuss our modeling approach, describe the operationalization of the 
various constructs, and report the results. The final section summarizes the findings, draws 




Product-harm crises can seriously hurt a firm’s performance. Often, a crisis is followed by a 
product recall, either voluntary or mandated by a government regulatory body.  During the 
prolonged out-of-stock situation associated with the product recall, customers may switch to 




   
 
impact, product unavailability may also influence future brand choices because of a changed 
opinion on the unavailable brand, or because of a lock-in to a rival brand (Goldfarb 2006). 
Moreover, the company is likely to face a damaged image and a substantial drop in consumer 
trust (Dawar and Pillutla 2000). Apart from the apparent impact on the affected 
brands/companies, a product-harm crisis may also corrode trust in the product category as a 
whole, as the inadequacy of the production process can be perceived to be an industry-wide 
problem (De Alessi and Staaf 1994; Jarrell and Peltzman 1985).
4  
The bad publicity surrounding the crisis tends to be weighed heavily when making 
product judgments - a phenomenon referred to as negativity bias - as it is perceived both as 
diagnostic and surprising (Herr, Kardes, and Kim 1991).  In addition, negative news is 
reported more frequently and more vividly, as it is against the norm (Weinberger and 
Lepkowska-White 2000), and considered more credible than positive news spread by the 
company itself (Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, and Unnava 2000). However, negativity effects can be 
moderated by several consumer characteristics, such as brand loyalty, brand familiarity and 
category usage. In addition, advertising may be used to counter the negative news, and be 
instrumental to re-establish trust in the category and/or brand. 

&RQVXPHU&KDUDFWHULVWLFV
3UHFULVLV%UDQG/R\DOW\Even though loyal consumers tend to be more aware of the 
crisis (Dawar and Pillutla 2000), they are also more likely to engage in biased processing 
(Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, and Unnava 2000). They tend to resist or discount information that is 
disconfirmatory or counterattitudinal, and to counter-argue negative news about their 
preferred brands more often in order to minimize cognitive dissonance (Dawar and Pillutla 




   
 
brand, and believe the company deserves their help (Stockmeyer 1996).  
Loyal customers have also been found to be less likely to switch brands during out-of-
stock situations: because of their limited experience with competing items, their search costs 
tend to be higher (Campo, Gijsbrechts, and Nisol, 2000), while they also incur higher 
substitution costs if they have to buy non-preferred items (Corstjens and Corstjens 1995).   
The presence of a loyal customer base is a key indicator of brand equity (Aaker 1996), 
which may offer resilience in the face of misfortune (Hoeffler and Keller 2003).  As such, we 
expect a positive impact of customers’ SUH-crisis loyalty on their SRVW-crisis trial rate, in line 
with the idea that a strong pre-crisis equity will give the brand a head start on its way to 
recovery, even after a prolonged recall period. 
3UHFULVLV%UDQG/R\DOW\7LPHBecause of the product recall, people no longer have 
the opportunity to increase their personal experience with the affected brand, while companies 
are not inclined to advertise a product that is not available (van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 
2006).  As personal experience and advertising are instrumental in maintaining brand equity 
(Aaker and Biel 1993), the protection offered by the pre-crisis loyalty of the customer base is 
expected to erode over time.  
3UHFULVLV%UDQG)DPLOLDULW\People exposed to new information on a familiar brand 
perceive positive news to be as diagnostic as negative information, as opposed to unfamiliar 
customers who tend to weigh negative news more heavily (Ahluwalia 2002). Jolly and 
Mowen (1985), for example, found that news of a product recall influenced evaluations of a 
company more negatively when the company was unknown. Furthermore, familiar brands are 
often perceived to be less responsible for a crisis (Mowen 1980).  As such, we expect a higher 
repurchase rate after the crisis for customers familiar with the affected products.
￿
 On the other 




   
 
Brands familiar to a large fraction of the population are likely to receive more scrutiny from 
the media than less familiar ones (Rhee and Haunschild 2006), making their crisis more 
salient to more customers.  
3UHFULVLV&DWHJRU\8VDJHHeavy users are likely to be more appreciative of the 
benefits of the product (Lim, Currim, and Andrews 2005), making them less likely to fully 
defect from the category.  Given their extensive experience with the category, they are also in 
a better position to make product judgments, and are expected to have lower perceived risks 
than light to medium users (Goering 1985).  We therefore expect a positive impact of pre-
crisis category usage on post-crisis trial rates.  
&KDQJHLQ&DWHJRU\8VDJHAs indicated earlier, a product-harm crisis may influence 
consumption in the category as a whole (De Alessi and Staaf 1994). Consumers who do not 
reduce category consumption, however, seem to have sustained trust in the category. It should 
be easier to convince these consumers to try the affected products once they become available 
again.  Indeed, a first hurdle (i.e., buying in the category) has already been taken.  On the 
other hand, as category consumption during the crisis can only occur through the purchase of 
competing (non-affected) brands, these customers’ familiarity and behavioral loyalty will 
increasingly shift towards those brands, making it harder to convince them to switch back to 
the affected products.  Because of these countervailing forces, we do not advance a directional 
hypothesis on the impact of a change in category usage. 

$GYHUWLVLQJ
2ZQ$GYHUWLVLQJ. Brand advertising is usually assumed to have a persuasive impact on 
brand purchase (Doganuglu and Klapper 2006).  However, the size of the effects tends to be 




   
 
of post-crisis investments to be even smaller, as the crisis may have damaged the firm’s 
credibility (Aaker, Fournier, and Brasel 2004; Goldberg and Hartwick 1990).  On the other 
hand, it has been argued that the heightened brand awareness and media attention during a 
crisis period could actually result in a higher return on advertising investments than if they 
were part of routine equity-building activities (Dawar 1998).   
&URVVDQG&RPSHWLWLYH$GYHUWLVLQJ. Apart from the own advertising, two kinds of 
“competing” advertising may have an impact: by other affected brands (which we label as 
cross advertising) and by non-affected competitors (referred to as competitive advertising)
Their impact on the trial rate of an affected brand may be two-fold.  On the one hand, this 
advertising could primarily serve an informational role, trying to resolve some of the 
uncertainty and risks associated with buying any product in the affected category (Byzalov 
and Shachar 2004).  Because of the resulting primary-demand effect, also the trial rate of 
directly affected products could be influenced positively (Lancaster 1984). On the other hand, 
cross and competitive advertising can primarily have a persuasive role, emphasizing the 
differential advantages of the specific brand being advertised, thereby delaying the purchase 
of all other brands.  It remains an empirical question which effect dominates. 
 
&URVVDQG&RPSHWLWLYH3XUFKDVHV
If consumers buy another brand after the crisis, the resulting purchase-feedback effects 
(Ailawadi, Gedenk, and Neslin 1999; Givon and Horsky 1990; Goldfarb 2006) may adversely 
impact the likelihood of trial of the affected brand under investigation. We control for two 
such effects: from non-affected brands (labeled as competitive purchase), and from the other 





   
 
We summarize the hypothesized effects in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
02'(/
Our focus is on the timing of the first purchase (“trial”) of the affected brands in the wake of 
their reintroduction in the marketplace.  A hazard model is developed to study when each 
affected brand will be purchased again once it is back on the shelves after the product recall.
6  
Hazard models account for right-censored observations, an important feature as not all 
households have bought the affected brands by the end of the observation period. These 
models also easily accommodate time-varying covariates (Allison 1984).  A semi-parametric 
proportional hazard model is adopted (Cox 1972). For Eta, the hazard rate is given by:
7  




























￿ W W W = W ; W W + = a b l l   .  (1) 




￿ l is the baseline hazard, which corresponds to the trial rate of the base group, i.e. 





￿ is a vector of covariates for 
consumer L that cause an up- or downward adjustment in that baseline (Helsen and 
Schmittlein 1993). Both time-varying (e.g., advertising support) and time-invariant (e.g., pre-
crisis category usage) covariates are considered.  The final term in the expression captures the 
effect of covariates (e.g., pre-crisis brand loyalty) for which the effect is allowed to gradually 
increase/decrease over time.  In line with Wedel et al. (1995), we do this by including an 





￿ , with the time elapsed since the start of the 
crisis, WW
c.  This time component consists of the length of the recall period (W
c) and the time 
elapsed since the product is available again (W). 
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& = 0). It excludes from the numerator all right-censored households, i.e. 
those who did not purchase Etaduring the observation period.  For households who made a 
purchase at a specific time W
&, one considers the likelihood that the purchase was made by 
household Lrather than by any of the other households still “at risk” (i.e. who have not yet 













1 U , = 1 if household M has not yet bought Eta before 
W
& and zero otherwise.  Even though right-censored observations are excluded from the 
numerator in (2), they appear in the risk-set composition of the denominator. Note that the 
baseline hazard cancels out from the partial likelihood function. As a result, no distributional 
specification for the baseline hazard is needed.  
  As two brands, Eta and Kraft, were affected by the product-harm crisis under 
consideration, we extend the single-event model specified in (2) to a multiple-failure model, 
by considering both partial likelihoods:
9  
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consists of those households who have not yet bought that brand. As such, the risk-set 
composition is brand specific, which corresponds to the marginal risk-set approach of Wei, 
Lin, and Weissfeld (1989).
   Moreover, we allow for different covariate effects for the two 
considered events. Our multiple-event specification differs from the repeated-event model 
used in Helsen and Schmittlein (1994), where subjects can only appear in the risk set of the 
second event after they have experienced the first event, and from the cause-specific 
competing-risk model in Seetharaman and Chintagunta (2003), which would require 
households to be assigned to one of the events at the start of the observation period.  It also 
differs from the destination-specific competing-risk approach adopted in Gönül and 
Srinivasan (1993), where households would disappear from the second risk set once they have 
purchased the other brand.  In our specification, households can buy either of the two brands 
as soon as they become available again after the product recall, and buying one of the brands 
does not preclude them from also buying the other brand, either at an earlier or later point in 
time. Another way to approach the problem would be to model the timing of the first purchase 
in the category, along with a choice model to indicate which brand was purchased at that 
occasion (see Chintagunta and Prasad 1998 for a similar approach). However, in so doing, one 
would not consider all first purchases of the affected brands, as one would exclude the first 
Eta (Kraft) purchases that took place after either Kraft (Eta) or a non-affected competing 
brand was purchased.  
  A household’s purchase decisions for the two affected brands are unlikely to be 








!W, we include (in a time-varying way) both the post-crisis volume purchased of Kraft 
(Eta) and the advertising support given to Kraft (Eta).  However, even after accounting for a 




   
 
2000 for a similar approach), there may still be some unobserved correlation left between the 
two hazard rates. While a failure to appropriately control for this unobserved dependence does 
not have an impact on the consistency of the parameter estimates, it does affect the estimated 
variance-covariance matrix (Lin and Wei 1989).  We therefore adopt the robust, “clustered” 
approach advocated in Lin (1994) to estimate the variance-covariance matrix.  This approach 
accounts for the within-household (i.e. within-cluster) correlation in the two timing decisions, 




Household scanner data describing the peanut-butter purchases of 615 households in two 
major Australian cities (Melbourne and Sydney) were obtained from ACNielsen Australia.  
The data covered five years (1996-2000).  These were split in two initialization periods 
(01/01/1996 until 06/26/1996, the start of the crisis, and 06/27/1996 until 11/24/1996, the end 
of the crisis), used to quantify consumer purchase characteristics, respectively, before and 
during the crisis, and an estimation period (11/25/1996 until 31/12/2000).  All households 
made at least one purchase in the peanut-butter category in the pre-crisis period.   
In this crisis setting, we consider two affected brands of different strength. Before the 
crisis, Eta had a market share of 13 percent, while the stronger Kraft had a market share of 40 
percent. After its five month recall period, Kraft was able to recuperate rather quickly, 
reaching 70 percent of pre-crisis sales levels within one quarter of its reintroduction. Eta, on 
the other hand, had a much harder time to recover from the negative events, reaching less than 
half of its pre-crisis sales levels after one quarter. These differences are reflected in the 
observed trial decisions. Of the households in the panel, 123 (20%) made a post-crisis 
purchase of Eta, while 299 (49%) bought Kraft again. The median (completed) time to 




   
 
advertising spending (in AU$) by the major brands in the two areas was also provided by 
ACNielsen Australia.  Contrary to brand prices, advertising was heavily used as a competitive 
weapon by Kraft’s competitors during the product recall, and by Kraft Foods following the 
reintroduction of its affected brands (The Sydney Morning Herald 1996c). 
 
([SODQDWRU\YDULDEOHV
We now turn to the operationalization of the explanatory variables included. Table 2 shows 
key descriptive statistics. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
In line with Bucklin, Gupta, and Siddarth (1998), we specify pre-crisis loyalty to an affected 
brand as its within-household market share before the crisis (3UHFULVLV %UDQG/R\DOW\. 
Following Ackerberg (2001), we operationalize pre-crisis brand familiarity as the number of 
days since the last purchase before the start of the crisis (3UHFULVLV%UDQG)DPLOLDULW\).
10 In 
contrast to a simpler 0/1 operationalization, this measure takes into account the decreasing 
impact over time of a previous purchase experience with the brand (Mehta, Rajiv, and 
Srinivasan 2004).As with the brand loyalty measure, we again focus on how the recency of 
the last purchase SULRU to the crisis affects a customer’s SRVW-crisis trial rate, which is 
consistent with our interest in investigating the impact of a brand’s pre-crisis equity on its 
speed of recovery after the crisis.  Similar to Campo, Gijsbrechts, and Nisol (2003), we 
measure category usage as the average daily purchase quantity.We consider both average 
category consumption before the crisis (3UHFULVLV&DWHJRU\8VDJH), and the difference (in 
percentage terms) between average category usage during and before the crisis (&KDQJHLQ
&DWHJRU\8VDJH). &URVVand &RPSHWLWLYH3XUFKDVHVare specified as two weekly time-varying 




   
 
affected brand and the non-affected competitors since the end of the crisis 
  With regard to advertising, we include in each marginal model three weekly time-
varying covariates measuring advertising of, respectively, the affected brand (2ZQ
$GYHUWLVLQJ, the other affected brand (&URVV$GYHUWLVLQJ), and the non-affected competitors 
(&RPSHWLWLYH$GYHUWLVLQJ). To also capture potential carry-over effects of advertising, we 
estimate the stock of advertising effort available to the brand as an exponentially weighted 
average of current and past advertising expenditures (see e.g., Dutta, Narasimhan, and Rajiv 
1999): 
, ) 1 ( 1 - - + =
M
M
M $'672&. $'9 $'672&. a a       (4) 
where $'9
! is the advertising expenditure in week W,  and $'672&.
!  the corresponding 
advertising stock. The parameter a reflects the decay in advertising effectiveness. We allow 
for different decay parameters for advertising expenditures by the three brands (Eta, Kraft and 
non-DIIHFWHGFRPSHWLWRUVDQGGHWHUPLQHWKHUHVSHFWLYH -values through a grid search (see 
Tellis and Weiss 1995 for a similar practice).  
   As control variables, we also add the DUHD of residence (Melbourne or Sydney), the 
KRXVHKROGVL]H(as in Jain and Vilcassim 1991), as well as the volume purchased in the 
category on the previous purchase occasion.  The latter variable is included to control for 
potential LQYHQWRU\ effects (see Chintagunta and Prasad 1998 for a similar practice).  
 
5(68/76
Table 3 shows the parameter estimates for the model outlined in Section 4. The first column 
presents the results for Eta, while the second column shows the estimates for Kraft.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
3UHFULVLVOR\DOW\ has a significant ( 01 . 0 < S ) positive impact on trial for both Eta and Kraft. 




   
 
(Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, and Unnava 2000), and is in line with the findings of  Campo, 
Gijsbrechts, and Nisol (2000) that loyal customers switch less in an out-of-stock situation due 
to higher substitution and search cost.  This protection is found to gradually erode, however, 
as indicated by the negative LQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQOR\DOW\DQGWLPH ( 01 . 0 < S ). 
The parameter estimates for SUHFULVLVEUDQGIDPLOLDULW\ are significantly negative 
( 01 . 0 < S and  05 . 0 < S for Eta and Kraft, respectively ).
 11 This finding confirms our 
prediction that product experience can trigger defensive strategies against negative 
information on the brand (Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, and Unnava 2001), although this applies 
mostly for recent purchases because of forgetting (Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan 2004). The 
effect of SUHFULVLVFDWHJRU\XVDJH on the probability of trial is significantly positive (S < 
0.05) for both Eta and Kraft.  Heavy users are less inclined to cancel their purchases, as they 
are more familiar with the benefits of the product (Lim, Currim, and Andrews 2005), and 
have lower perceived risks than light or medium users (Goering 1985). Apart from the 
category usage before the crisis, also the FKDQJHLQFDWHJRU\XVDJH during the crisis is 
important.  A reduction is indicative of the extent to which trust in the category as a whole is 
lost.  A positive effect (causing a delayed trial if the usage rate is reduced) is obtained for both 
brands, even though statistical significance is only obtained for Kraft (S < 0.05). 
2XUJULGVHDUFKRQWKHGHFD\SDUDPHWHUVIRUWKHDGVWRFNYDULDEOHVUHVXOWHGLQ -values   
ranging from 0.1 (Eta) to 0.2 (non-affected competitors), which are in line with the retention 
rates reported in Fader, Lattin, and Little (1992) and George, Mercer, and Wilson (1996).  
While RZQDGYHUWLVLQJ has a significant positive effect on the trial probability of Kraft 
( 05 . 0 < S )
12, advertising expenditures for Eta are not effective in stimulating Eta’s post-crisis 
trial rate (S > 0.10).  Using aggregate analyses, and focusing on the total sales impact rather 




   
 
advertising effect for Eta, and a positive post-crisis advertising effectiveness for Kraft.   Not 
surprisingly,
13 Eta was not helped by Kraft’s advertising either, while it also did not have 
enough clout to create a positive spill-over to Kraft.   With regard to FRPSHWLWLYHDGYHUWLVLQJ 
from non-affected competitors, we find a negative effect for both affected brands 
( 05 . 0 < S and  10 . 0 < S for Kraft and Eta, respectively), implying that competitive 
advertising was more persuasive than informational.  In terms of the FURVVSXUFKDVH effects, 
an interesting asymmetry is observed. While a purchase for the stronger brand (Kraft) delays 
(S < 0.01) the subsequent trial of the smaller brand (Eta), no such effect is observed when Eta 
was first purchased. Strong brands are known to impact competitors extensively, while their 
vulnerability is typically low (Kamakura and Russell, 1989). &RPSHWLWLYHSXUFKDVHV did not (S 
> 0.10) delay the purchase of either brand.  
Finally, two of the control variables turned out to be significant.   ,QYHQWRU\ has the 
expected negative sign (Campo, Gijsbrechts, and Nisol 2003) for Kraft, while the parameter 
estimate for KRXVHKROGVL]H is significantly positive for both brands, supporting the idea that 
larger households purchase more frequently (Chintagunta and Prasad, 1998).  The place of 




A product-harm crisis can be devastating for an affected brand. Consumers tend to weigh bad 
publicity heavily in product judgments, while purchases of competing brands during the recall 
period may shift preferences towards these brands. In addition, non-affected competitors often 
try to profit from the crisis situation by increasing their own advertising spending. 




   
 
brand equity will help them weather the storm, and tend to resort to advertising 
communications to rebuild their tarnished image. Our research, though limited to one case 
study, allows us to contrast along both dimensions the performance of a ‘strong’ (Kraft) and 
‘weaker’ (Eta) brand owned by the same company (Kraft Foods). Both brands were recalled 
for more than five months, during which their market shares dropped from 13 (Eta) and 40 
(Kraft) percent to zero.  While Kraft was able to reach 70 percent of its pre-crisis sales level 
within one quarter of its reintroduction, Eta had a much harder time to recover, with less than 
half of its pre-crisis sales level recovered after one quarter.  Our findings help put these 
differences in perspective. 
First, we found that pre-crisis equity indeed provides an important protection against 
product-harm crises. Even after an out-of-stock situation of more than five months, both loyal 
and more familiar consumers (i.e. who bought the brand more recently) showed a 
significantly higher trial probability once the product was back on the shelves.  Even though 
the parameter estimates were comparable for both brands,  Kraft’s pre-crisis loyalty (42% on 
average, see Table 2) and familiarity (119 days) were considerably higher than for Eta (13% 
and 159 days), giving the former considerably more resilience against the crisis.  Moreover, 
strong brands have been found to be less vulnerable and to have more clout (Kamakura and 
Russel 1989). Our results indicate that these effects also apply in the context of a product 
crisis:  households who bought the stronger Kraft brand became less likely to also buy Eta, 
while the reverse did not hold.  Hence, apart from the well-documented benefits (see e.g., 
Aaker 1991) that accrue to the brand in prosperous times (such as an increased effectiveness 
of marketing programs, the possibility of premium pricing, and a higher success rate for brand 
extensions), we identify the creation of a buffer against negative events as another important 




   
 
equity literature (see e.g., Hoeffler and Keller 2003), we are, to the best of our knowledge, the 
first to empirically demonstrate it in a non-laboratory setting.       
However, this protection does not extend indefinitely.  During the recall period, 
consumers cannot nurture their relationship with the brand through personal experiences, 
while companies are not inclined to advertise a brand that is not available. As a consequence, 
the loyalty effect tends to decrease over time. Moreover, the longer the time elapsed since the 
last purchase of the particular brand, the smaller its trial probability becomes. As such, one 
should try to keep the recall period as short as possible, and perhaps announce well ahead of 
time the products’ renewed availability. 
Also the intensity of category usage was found to be an important moderator. Usage 
increases the experience with the category and decreases the perceived risks of using the 
product (Goering 1985).  However, not only pre-crisis category usage matters.  A crisis can 
impact other –not directly affected- brands within the category, as the inadequacy of the 
production process may be perceived to be an industry-wide problem. Consumers who cancel 
all (or most) of their purchases during the recall period have lost trust in the category, and 
have switched to other categories. Bringing them back on board is hard, and may take a 
prolonged effort from all industry participants.   
Finally, companies often resort to advertising to restore trust in their affected brands 
(Coombs 2000; Hale, Dulek, and Hale 2005). Brand advertising for Kraft turned out to be 
effective in convincing consumers to return to the brand, while Eta‘s advertising was not.  
This suggests an additional benefit of having a strong equity: not only does it offer a direct 
buffer against product crises, it also increases the effectiveness of post-recall communication 
efforts.   




   
 
consumers’ trial rates following a specific product-harm crisis. Different avenues for future 
research can therefore be formulated. In line with previous research on the impact of out-of-
stock situations (Campo, Gijsbrechts, and Nisol 2003), future research could examine whether 
a crisis can also have an impact on other components of purchase behavior such as quantity 
and category-consumption decisions.  Moreover, rather than just focusing on the trial 
decision, one could also consider the subsequent purchases.  In addition, apart from 
discovering ways for affected brands to recover from a product-harm crisis, it would also be 
interesting to look at how non-affected brands can benefit from the opportunity. Future work 
could also look at the spillover effects of a product-harm crisis for the affected brand in other 
countries and other product categories.  Finally, we focused on one particular product-harm 
crisis. It would be useful to replicate our analysis in other crisis settings. Not only would such 
studies enable empirical generalizations, they could also determine whether certain factors, 
such as the perceived locus of responsibility for the crisis (Folkes 1984) or competitive 














Pre-crisis Brand Loyalty   + 
Pre-crisis Brand Loyalty * Time  - 
Pre-crisis Brand Familiarity   +/- 
Pre-crisis Category Usage  + 
Change in Category Usage  +/- 
   
$GYHUWLVLQJ  
Own Advertising
   + 
Cross Advertising
  +/- 
Competitive Advertising
  +/- 
   
&URVVDQG&RPSHWLWLYH3XUFKDVHV  
Cross purchases  - 










3UHFULVLV%UDQG/R\DOW\        
Eta  13  31  0  100 
Kraft  42  46  0  100 
        
3UHFULVLV%UDQG)DPLOLDULW\        
Eta  159  45  3  178 
Kraft  119  67  1  178 
        
&DWHJRU\8VDJH        
Pre-crisis Category Usage (in grams per day)  6.83  6.58  1.12  56.88 
Change in Category Usage (in percentage)  -15%  108%  -100%  1130% 






   
Eta Advertising
  1.95  3.20  0.00  13.73 
Kraft Advertising
  11.58  8.11  0.42  46.17 
Competitive Advertising
  2.46  5.93  0.00  35.26 
        
&URVVSXUFKDVHVLQJUDPV        
Eta  9.57  23.04  0.00  252.50 
Kraft  1.63  6.24  0.00  93.60 
        
&RPSHWLWLYHSXUFKDVHVLQJUDPV        
Eta  17.42  49.73  0.00  798.75 
Kraft  21.83  52.26  0.00  667.5 






 52%       
        
+RXVHKROG6L]H 3.43  1.46  1.00  8.00 
        
,QYHQWRU\LQJUDPV        
Eta  3.27  2.30  0.00  27.50 
Kraft  2.85  2.40  0.00  26.25 
(a) To illustrate the variation over the analyzed 214-week period of the time-varying advertising measures, we 
report the mean and standard deviation of the adstock variables over the estimation period.  
 (b) Dummy variable indicating whether the household lives in Sydney (value 1) or Melbourne (value 0).We 
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(a) Robust standard errors between brackets. *,** and *** indicate a significant result at, respectively, the 10%, 
5% and 1% significance level. Reported significance tests are one-sided, except for Pre-crisis Brand Familiarity, 
Change in Category Usage, Cross and Competitive Advertising and Area, as no clear direction was specified for 
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1 See http://www.pwcglobal.com/cz/eng/about/press-rm/2006/pressrm09_06.html. 
2 Product quality and handling of complaints were ranked as first and second, respectively. 
3 This crisis was also investigated in a recent study by van Heerde, Helsen, and Dekimpe 
(2006). However, their use of aggregate performance measures precluded the detection of any 
individual-level differences in how consumers react to the crisis. 
4 For instance, when Merck had to remove Vioxx, its arthritis painkiller, from the market after 
the drug was linked to increased heart-attack risks, many patients worried that other drugs in 
the Group of so-called COX-2 inhibitors might carry the same risks (International Herald 
Tribune 2004). 
5 We do not consider an interaction effect with time, as our operationalization of pre-crisis 
brand familiarity already accounts for a decreasing impact with time. We refer to section 4 for 
more details. 
6 A hazard approach was also used to model the adoption timing of new products in 
Chandrashekaran and Sinha (1995) and Steenkamp and Gielens (2003), among others. 
7 A comparable expression can be derived for Kraft. 
8 See Allison (1984) for an in-depth discussion.   
9 If one assumes independence between a household’s purchase decisions of  Eta and Kraft, 
Equation (3) is separable.  As indicated below, we do not make this assumption, and use the 
clustered error-correction procedure  advocated by Lin (1994) to explicitly account for 
possible within-household correlation across both decisions. 
10 Households that did not purchase the affected brand before the crisis were given the 
maximum value for pre-crisis familiarity (178 days). In unreported analyses, we increased this 




   
 
                                                                                                                                                   
11 Since the degree of pre-crisis familiarity decreases with the number of days since the last 
purchase before the crisis (Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan 2004), we expect a negative sign. 
12 In unreported analyses, we checked for interaction effects between this advertising variable 
and the aforementioned individual-level characteristics. However, no such evidence was 
found.  
13  Indeed, cross effects of marketing programs are usually smaller than own elasticities 
(Steenkamp et al. 2002). 
  